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This article is an introduction to the Buddhist schools of philosophy as recorded by Jagadguru Vidyāraṇya Swāmī in the book Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha.

The first half article is analysis and refutation of philosophy of Cārvāka-s by Vidyāraṇya Swāmī himself. The next sections are in doctrine of impermanence and 4 buddhist schools respectively.

Analysis of Cārvāka-s

Cārvaka-s only believed in direct perception as pramāṇa and rejected inference and verbal testimony (Veda-s) as pramāṇa.

Thus the Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha-s Buddhist section starts by refuting the tendency of cārvākas to reject invariable concomitance/vyāpti.(Invariable concomitance : An unconditional, causal relationship between two elements where the presence of one implies the presence of the other.

Ascertainment of concomitance:

Via “Utpatti/Creation” and “Swabhāva”/Nature, this causal relationship (concomitance) can be established as following:

(1) Kārya-Kāraṇa(Ascertainment of an effectuation):

  e.g. Fire and Smoke –
(a) Smoke is not cognised unless there exists fire.

(b) Fire produces smoke

Via induction, the invariable concomitance between both of these elements(fire and smoke) can be easily established – for if someone rejects it – its equivalent of calling one’s own mother barren, says Sāyaṇa Mādhavācārya!

(2) Svabhāva (Identity): By ascertainment of Identity, ascertainment of invariable concomitance can be similarly established. Before existence – no effect can be cognised, any effect shall only be cognised by presence of a cause.

Lets suppose we have access to attributes of the universal set of a subject, trees here i.e., we have information about every tree that could ever exist – if any tree were to be identified, we would simply look at the attributes of that tree, or if we come to see any attributes of a tree; we would know which tree is it.

Lack of attributes would simply point towards the inexistence of the subject.

Thus, declared Tathāgata:

Pramāṇantarasāmānyasthitiranyadhiyo gateḥ|
pramānantarasadbhāvaḥ pratishedhācca kasyachidati||

>”The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its negation by a certain person”.

Its thus concluded here that inference is indeed a necessary and valid pramāṇa.

Buddhist philosophy

Before the discussion of various schools and their differences, we must first discuss what’s common to all of them : the doctrine of momentariness/Kṣaṇikavāda.

Doctrine of Kṣaṇikavāda

The doctrine is such : The momentariness of all transient (impermanent) things such as color blue (or any other quality), is to be inferred from their very existence and whatever exists is thus momentary.

Arguments :

>For existence, (arthakriyākāritva) casual efficacy (property of something to “cause”), is established by perception.

>Anything that is not momentary lacks existence because of two reasons: a permanent thing can’t be a subject to either “succession” or “simultaneity”. Since existence is defined by causal efficacy and that causal efficacy can only occur via succession or simultaneity, the permanent is excluded from existence.

Establishing the argument: “Permanent entity is unable of having inherent ability to create an effect” –

>Question: During the moment a permanent entity is producing its current effect, does the permanent entity possess the power of producing its past and future effects?

• If yes, it must produce all of its effects at once right now because whatever has the power of doing something at a point must produce it at that point of time.
• If not, then it never had the ability (causal efficacy) to produce those effects.

Argument of auxiliary causes

>An argument can be produced where the permanent entity can produce its effects by employing a series of auxiliary causes.

Question: Do these auxiliary causes really assist the permanent entity?

• If they do not then they’re useless and we discard that possibility.
• If they do, is the assistance something different from the entity or identical to it?
• If different, then this different assistance should be the new cause and NOT the permanent entity.
• If identical to identity → then a “modified entity” comes into being and the former one without assistance has ceased to exist.

Therefore by the former lines of argument it can be safely deduced that causal efficacy in a non momentary entity is not possible implying that existence is restricted to the momentary. 

Mādhyamika Śunyavāda

The four negations:

Buddha taught that (in mādhyamika-s opinion):

>The superimposed illusion(of something’s existence)

>The basis(of something’s existence)

>The connection between illusion and basis

>The act of seeing OR the seer

If any one of these elements is unreal then it necessarily follows that all are unreal as all are equally subject to negation.

Thus, this baselessness (so to say) is reached in progression as in moving first through the doctrine of momentary flux(kṣaṇikavāda) and then through the negation of illusory assurances of pleasure, universality and reality.

The principal is that the void that is free from the four alternatives –

• Is not real
• Is not unreal
• Not both real and unreal
• Not neither real or unreal

The classical ghaṭa (pot) example is that if real existence OR the non-existence(cause must create an existent effect) were the intrinsic nature of the pot then the potters effort to create it would be pointless.

Since existence and non-existence are contradictory to each other, rest two possibilities of both and neither are rejected.

Thus from these four points of view all conceptual proliferation {(prapa~nca):conceptualization that leads to duḥkha or suffering} has ceased, the final liberation, void, results which is the highest attainable state according to the mādhyamika-s.

Thus there are only 2 duties of a student :
(1) Interrogation
(2) Acceptance

Vidyāraṇya swāmī states : Ironically, Mādhyamika-s are good at accepting (their preachers) but incapable of interrogation and hence makes a funny interpretation of middle way of Mādhyamika-s as “mediocres”.

Yogācāra 

 

 

Yogācārins accept the four points of view as earlier discussed but with a change that is, “external void” and thus the philosophy is often termed as the ‘Doctrine of mind alone’.

Argument for internal non-void :

>Self subsistent consciousness must be acknowledged otherwise the entirety of existence would be unknowable. 

>Dharmakīrti thus proclaims – “For one who denies perception, vision of objects is impossible”.

Argument against atomism :

Question : Is the object of cognition a simple atom or complex body?

>If complex, then it is inconsistent with the dilemma whether we perceive the part or the whole.

>If atomic then it’s impossible as atoms are supersensible.

>Also, if atoms combine with each other to form a bigger object then they must have ‘sides inherently and thus they would themselves be not parts  but objects.

Therefore by these lines of reasoning, Yogācārins deduce that the intellect has no other object to perceive but itself, thus there is nothing to be objectified by the intellect. Since there is no distinction between the perceiver and the perceived, intellect is self luminous.

Eg. Blue and other objects are cognized by cognitions,  if they were different –  the objects could have no connection to the cognition (the color blue in this case).

Sahopalaṁbha Niyama : Invariable simultaneous apprehension :

“Sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ” : 

Because the color blue and the consciousness of blue are always perceived together, they are non-different entities.This principle states that since the object of awareness(the color blue) and the awareness of the object (cognition of blue) are always and invariably perceived together thus can not exist as two different entities.

Ālaya-Vij~nāna (Ālaya:House+Vij~nāna:Consciousness):

The appearance of separation between the subjective consciousness and objective physical world is an illusion. The cause of illusion is the habit of thinking in terms of difference.

Ālaya-Vij~nāna is basically a storehouse of consciousness which contains the karmic bīja-s(seeds) from past actions. These seeds are the reason that subject-object duality is perceived as an illusion.

Purifying this Ālaya (storehouse of karma-s) leads to non-dual awareness known as “Mahodaya”, which is the highest attainable state in the philosophy of Yogācārins.

Sautrāntika

Sautrāntika-s hold the position that the principle of invariable simultaneousness cognition which Yogācārins use is flawed as indecisive.

Arguments : Sautrāntika-s basically put forth two types of arguments.

Argument 1 – Circular reasoning involved in proving the identity of subject and object.

If the object, blue or otherwise, were merely a form of cognition, it should be presented to us as “I” and not “this” because the cognition and the object would be the same.

>Question : What if the blue form which is just cognition, is illusorily projected as external and as other than the self.

>If there are no external objects then the comparison “as if it were external” is indecisive and what an opponent would often say is like declaring “son of a childless mother”. 

It’s an infinite loop of proving manifestation of identity (subject) by arguing for the illusoriness of duality(object) and proving the illusoriness of duality via manifestation of identity.

Argument 2 – Linguistic failure.

When it is said “as if it were external”, it must be assumed the existence of a truly external world. 

Thus, a Vadato-Vyāghāta dosha (contradiction) is found and the arguments of both Nāgārjuna-s Śunyavāda & Yogācāra are hence rejected by the Sautrāntika-s.

Bāhyārthānumeyavāda (“Doctrine of inferred external objects”) 

According to the Sautrāntika-s, a real and external world of momentary objects exists but we never perceive this world directly.

The external object works as a cause that imprints its ākāra  (form) onto our consciousness. Thus, what we directly perceive is not the object itself but a mental projection. From this mental projection then, we infer the existence and nature of the external object that causes this projection.

(Direct & indirect realism)

Vaibhāṣhika

Vaibhāṣhika-s in progression towards realism consider all the above philosophical arguments to be absurd (Viruddha-bhāṣā). According to the philosophical school of Sautrāntika-s believing in inferred sensibles – there will be no directly perceptible object.

Argument of inability to establish inference :

>We already know that, from the beginning, that for an inference to be valid there must be invariable concomitance (vyāpti).

>If one can not directly perceive the external object then it would be hard to accept concomitance or any relationship between various elements under inspection.

>Implying that inferences would be impossible, which is not what we would want in a logical world.

Bāhyārthapratyakṣavāda : Doctrine of directly perceived external objects

Therefore, Vaibhāṣhika-s classify objects in two categories : 

1. Non-conceptual/Real perception (Nirvikalpa pratyakṣa) : Believed to be a valid means of knowledge.
2. Conceptual perception (Savikalpa pratyakṣa) : This could be called an auxiliary perception which interprets the available perceptible information but could be potentially illusory.

Swāmī Vidyāraṇya-s refutation

(1) Substratum-less negation (niradhiṣṭhānika-niṣedha-anupapatti) 

Mādhyamika-s, the absolute nihilists/sarva-vaināśika-s (destroyer of everything, to say) posit that everything, external objects and the internal consciousness, is void (Sarvaśunyatvam : That everything is śunya).

So the arguments are : 

> To state “everything is void” is to make an assertion.

> The act of assertion and the  subject who asserts can not themselves be void.

> If the proponent of the philosophy is also void – their theses are themselves unfounded.

Implying that we certainly need to have some positive ground to play the logical game of negations & we can not keep negating something that is non-existent and to accept existence is contradictory to the philosophy of śunyavāda.

(2)Yogācārin external object 

The primary argument of this school is that “reality is consciousness-only (vij~nāptimātra) and the external world is a projection of the mind stream & the variety in our perceptions is not merely accidental but dependent on the storehouse consciousness that is, ālaya-vij~nāna”.

Now coming to the refutation : Any object and its projection on the consciousness already implies that the act of projection is dependent on that external object. For example, we don’t just have “consciousness”, we have “consciousness of something, say pot”. This pot-ness (ghatatva) can not be alone explained by internal impressions alone and if it were to be, perception would be extremely random and private to each other.

The fact that any such experience is public and consistent, as in if a pot is to be placed on a table then any number of sane and non-blind people will assert the same experience of viewing a pot on the table. The Yogācārin can not thus satisfactorily explain cognition without admitting an external object.

(3) Sautrāntika-s inference confusion

Sautrāntika-s posit that the external world exists and is knowable only through inference (and not direct perception). But they also argue for the momentariness of the external world, that is, by the time consciousness recognizes an object – it has already ceased to exist.

Now, let’s assume the same condition of a pot on the table. If even for once your consciousness and the object don’t exist together, is it possible for your consciousness to convey that there was a pot on the table?

Or if one has not for once seen a fire and the resultant smoke, if they see smoke, how likely is it for them to infer that there is a fire and thus smoke?

Answers for both questions are certainly : not likely. Thus the inference of the sautrāntika-s being based on zero evidence has no value and amounts to an unsatisfactory idea.

(4) Vaibhāṣika-s recognition (pratyabhijña) problem 

Vaibhāṣika-s on other hand posit that both the conscious mind and the external objects are real as well as directly perceptible. And as other buddhist schools they hold on to doctrine of momentariness as well. Thus, everything exists but for a moment, they perish after a single moment.

The refutation is that if at every moment, there is different cognition of the same object then recognition(pratyabhij~na) becomes impossible. The fact that : 

1. Memory &
2. Recognition universally exists, proves the existence of a permanent “witness self” that is like a thread connecting experiences.

The fact that you recognize your consistently aging parents every next day after waking up that yes it’s my father or my mother is a simple negation for this philosophical school.

Conclusion

• For all Buddhists, kṣaṇikawada/momentariness is a common theory.
• There are two valid means of knowledge :  Perception and Inference respectively.
• Buddha was one, but there were 4 prominent philosophical schools: Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika & Vaibhāṣhika.

(1)Mādhyamika : Nihillistic/Universal void
(2)Yogācāra : Subjective idealism/External void
(3)Sautantrika : Inferribility of External objects
(4)Vaibhāsika : Perceptibility of External objects

• The congregation, and the red vesture are adopted by bauddha mendicants.

 

 

 

 

 

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References, notes, additional reading material:

(1) Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha, the main text reference for the article.

(2) For better understanding of gist, we have referred and borrowed from Cowell and AEG translation of the Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha and suggest it to the readers.

(3) Additional suggested materials:

Although not used, a must have text in this section is “Bauddha Darśana aur Vedānta”, a comparative philosophy text authored by Pujyapāda Śaṁkarācārya of Purī.

Wisdom library : Comparative Nyāya and Buddhist philosophy 

Philosophy of Nyāya Vaiśeshika

Author: Aryan Pandey